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The Editorial on the Research Topic
The Metaphorical Brain
Long considered a peripheral topic in linguistics, metaphor is increasingly viewed as a central
feature of higher cognition and abstract thought. Investigation of the neural substrate of metaphor
has, similarly, become more sophisticated, involving increasingly specific suggestions about
the processes involved in its comprehension. This Frontiers Research Topic brings together
contributions from a diverse array of cognitive neuroscience to offer a snapshot of current research
on the neural substrate of figurative language, and present a number of avenues for future research.
The result is an interdisciplinary perspective on the differences between literal and figurative
language and how the underlying neurobiological processes can be investigated.
Indeed, most investigations into the neural substrate of metaphor ultimately concern
the relationship between literal and metaphorical meanings. In their excellent review paper,
Vulchanova and colleagues outline the arguments for and against the continuity thesis that literal
and metaphorical language comprehension recruits essentially the same processing mechanisms.
Using autism as a lens through which to consider the issue, they review data that indicate
dissociations in the comprehension of literal and figurative language within individuals with
ASD. Ultimately, they suggest figurative language deficits in ASD stem from the difficulty these
individuals have integrating contextual information to build the situation model.
One source of support for the idea that literal andmetaphorical comprehension processes recruit
distinct neural substrates is the increasingly contentious claim that the right cerebral hemisphere
(RH) plays a crucial role in the comprehension of metaphor, but not literal language. Ianni and
colleagues note that much of the data supporting this claim comes from the study of brain-injured
patients that have employed sub-optimal tasks for assessing metaphor comprehension. They
present a novel test with fine-grained sensitivity to participants’ ability to understand both literal
and metaphorical language. They present data from three patients to demonstrate (i) comparable
impairment on literal and metaphorical language, (ii) greater impairment for metaphorical than
literal language, and (iii) selective impairment on metaphorical language.
Addressing the issue of hemispheric specialization in healthy adults, Lai and colleagues examine
functional neuroimaging data as participants read literal and metaphorical sentences with varying
degrees of familiarity. They found that decreasing familiarity (i.e., increasing novelty) of both literal
and metaphorical language led to greater activation bilaterally, with more extensive recruitment
of LH brain regions overall. However, the relative contribution of the RH was greater for novel
metaphors, as a result of reduced LH activation for novel literal language.
Faust and colleagues utilize network theory in their discussion of hemispheric specialization
for metaphor comprehension. In particular, they suggest that the LH exhibits semantic rigidity,
manifested by networks in which each node is connected to a small number of other nodes. Rigid
networks are well suited for the rapid retrieval of conventional meanings, but ill-suited for creating
meanings needed for novel metaphors. The RH exhibits semantic chaos, manifested by highly
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inter-connected networks that enable fast connections between
semantically distant concepts. Although inter-connectivity
facilitates the comprehension of novel metaphors, its
pathological extreme can be seen in schizophrenia and
accompanying thought disorder.
Mashal and colleagues examined brain activity as
schizophrenics and age-matched controls read literal phrases,
conventional metaphors, and novel metaphors. They find novel
metaphors elicited greater activity in the RH precuneus and
superior parietal lobule (SPL) among schizophrenics than
controls, and that greater activation in this brain region was
correlated with better comprehension. In keeping with Faust
and Kennet’s suggestion that schizophrenia is associated with
greater inter-connectivity in the semantic network, Mashal and
colleagues found patients showed a greater degree of functional
coupling between the precuneus/SPL and other language
regions.
As is typical of studies of metaphor comprehension in
schizophrenia, Mashal and colleagues found evidence for
reduced comprehension in patients relative to controls. However,
figurative language is diverse, and requires multiple mechanisms
for its comprehension. Cognizant of this fact, Pesciarelli and
colleagues investigated whether patients with schizophrenia can
utilize both combinatorial mechanisms and the retrieval of
stored meanings in their comprehension of idioms. They report
evidence suggesting that the difficulty schizophrenic patients
have understanding metaphors is less pronounced in the case
of idioms for which they can rely on the retrieval of stored
meanings.
Differences between the processing of metaphors and idioms
are also supported by studies of healthy adults. Columbus
and colleagues asked whether domain-general aspects of
executive control influenced reading times for familiar and
unfamiliar metaphorical sentences and idioms. They found that
individuals with high executive control utilized context more
efficiently than those with low executive control to commit
to a metaphorical or literal reading of a target word. While
executive control led to advantages for both familiar and
unfamiliar metaphors, all participants read idioms efficiently,
reinforcing the importance of retrieval mechanisms for idiom
comprehension.
Metaphor comprehension is also impacted by individual
differences in abstraction ability. Roncero and de Almedia
examined figurative language processing in individuals with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). In two studies they explored whether
patients’ abstraction ability was related to how well they
interpreted metaphors, and whether saliency as measured
by aptness ratings as well as familiarity ratings influenced
patients’ metaphor interpretation scores. Their findings suggest
that patients with better abstraction ability produced better
interpretations, and that aptness, not familiarity predicted
patients’ metaphor interpretation ability.
Other investigators have examined the importance of
concreteness on understanding metaphors. Forgács and
colleagues compared ERPs to nouns in phrases that were
metaphorical (fluffy speech), concrete literal (nasal speech),
and abstract literal (ineffective speech). Whereas, adjectives
in literal phrases elicited typical ERP concreteness effects,
nouns in metaphorical phrases did not. Paradoxically, when
the novel metaphorical phrases were rated more concrete,
the ERPs to the target nouns resembled those to nouns in
abstract literal phrases. When the novel metaphorical phrases
were rated more abstract, the ERPs to target nouns resembled
those to nouns in concrete literal phrases. Results are argued
to support a model in which the literal meaning from the
concrete source domain in a metaphor is abstracted away from
its physical sense before it is mapped to the abstract target
domain.
Weiland and colleagues examined the priority of literal
meaning during the processing of metaphor and metonymy. In
this study, the literal meaning of the target expressions (e.g.,
These lawyers are hyenas) was induced via a briefly presented
prime (furry) prior to the target (hyenas). At the target word they
observed a reduction in the early ERP effect for both metaphors
and metonymies and a delay in the late ERP effect only for
metaphors. They suggested that the induced literal meaning
facilitated the first stage of metaphor comprehension, which
involves its literal sense.
Lakoff, in a theoretical contribution, outlined in brief his
influential approach to metaphor, describing the existence of
systematic metaphors in language, and arguing that they reflect
regularities in the conceptual system, that are in turn driven
by experiential correlations encoded neurally via spike timing
dependent plasticity. Lakoff details empirical support for his
theory that stems from linguistics, psychology, and cognitive
neuroscience. He dispels some unflattering and oversimplified
readings of his account, and sketches the beginnings of a neural
theory of metaphor.
Lakoff’s call for further research is taken up by a number
of other contributors to the volume. These researchers present
original research testing some of the predictions of embodied
metaphor theory, and its more general counterpart in embodied
cognition. For example, Schmidt-Snoek and colleagues compared
the event related brain response to metaphors whose source
domain evoked the auditory modality, as in “Her limousine was a
privileged snort,” or the motor modality, as in “The editorial was
a brass-knuckle punch,” and literal uses of the same words. They
found that auditory words elicited a slightly different pattern
of ERPs than did motor words, suggestive of non-overlapping
neural generators. These findings fit with predictions from
embodied metaphor theory that modality specific activations
contribute to both literal and metaphoric meanings of these
words.
Troyer and colleagues examine whether videos and still
images of point light walkers impact reading times for sentences
with action verbs. As one might expect from embodied models
of cognition, the perception of visual motion does impact the
processing of sentences with action verbs, but does so differently
for literal uses, such as “The chemist was walking to his lab,”
and metaphorical ones, such as “The company was walking to
its death.”
Similarly, Bardolph and Coulson recorded ERPs as
participants read words associated with different regions
of vertical space as they moved marbles in an upward or a
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downward directed motion. Words such as “floor” and “ceiling”
elicited very early congruency effects in the ERPs, consistent
with the involvement of motor regions in registering the conflict
between meaning and motion. Words such as “defeat” and
“victory,” whose vertical associations were metaphorical, elicited
congruency effects that emerged much later, in keeping with a
role in pragmatic inference.
By focusing on novel research on the neural basis of
metaphor, this Frontiers Research Topic provides insight into
the neurobiology of conceptual structure. The contributions
highlight how metaphor comprehension reveals hemispheric
differences in the organization of semantic memory, the
importance of executive function for high-level language
comprehension, and the differing roles of sensorimotor
activations for concrete and abstract concepts. Beyond the
individual contributions, we hope that this special focus will
inspire future research on the neural underpinnings of metaphor
in language, and metaphor in cognition more generally.
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